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Design and control of computer systems that operate in uncertain, competitive or adversarial, envir-
onments can be facilitated by formal modelling and analysis. In this paper, we focus on analysis of
complex computer systems modelled as turn-based 212-player games, or stochastic games for short, that
are able to express both stochastic and non-stochastic uncertainties. We offer a systematic overview of
games with respect to a broad class of quantitative properties expressible in temporal logic. These
include probabilistic linear-time properties, expected total, discounted and average reward properties,
and their branching-time extensions and multi-objective combinations. To demonstrate applicability of
the framework as well as its practical implementation in a tool called PRISM-games, we describe several
case studies that rely on analysis of stochastic games, from areas such as robotics, and networked and
distributed systems.
& 2016 European Control Association. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Since the dawn of the information age, correctness and safety
of computer systems have been central to their design and ana-
lysis. Computer systems typically operate in uncertain environ-
ments. The uncertainty can be stochastic due to, e.g., unreliable
communication media, faulty components or simply due to the
use of randomisation. Moreover, if components that cannot be
controlled are present in the environment, their adversarial or
competitive behaviour results in additional, non-stochastic
uncertainty. Examples of such systems appear in many domains,
from robotics and autonomous transport, to security, networked
and distributed systems, and power management.
It is natural to view such complex systems as games between
the controllable computer system and its (uncontrollable) envir-
onment. In this work, we present a comprehensive overview of
techniques used in veriﬁcation and controller (also called a strat-
egy) synthesis for systems modelled as 212-player games, or sto-
chastic games for short. In every step of a stochastic game, the two
players, Player 1 and Player 2, choose their moves and, based on
their choices, the next state of the game is determined, possibly in
a probabilistic fashion. Controller synthesis can then be viewed as
ﬁnding a winning strategy for Player 1, where Player 2 may playlished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights re
igators Grant VERIWARE and
18/1.
. Svoreňová),adversarially. Stochastic games have been employed, for example,
to support decision making and synthesise controllers for aircraft
power distribution [6], sensor network management in renewable
energy production plants [73], in human-in-the-loop UAV plan-
ning [46], and autonomous driving in the presence of hazards such
as pedestrians [81,33]. They arise naturally in the context of
security and defence, where they have been used in patrol plan-
ning [82], port defence [72], infrastructure protection [18], to
generate countermeasures for DNS bandwidth attacks [43] and to
analyse complex attack-defence scenarios in RFID goods manage-
ment system [4]. Through the use of abstraction and discretisation,
high-level control of hybrid and continuous systems can also be
addressed.
Stochastic games were ﬁrst introduced by Shapley in 1953 [71].
Various classes and modiﬁcations of these games have been
extensively studied since then and surveyed in, e.g.,
[47,61,22,48,54,21,62]. In this survey, we focus on turn-based
games, where players choose their moves in turns rather than
concurrently as in [71,47,61]. More speciﬁcally, we restrict our
attention to turn-based, ﬁnite, complete-observation, stochastic,
discrete-time, zero-sum games. We also consider a generalisation
of these games to multiple players. Compared to existing surveys
of these games such as [22], the distinguishing feature of our
survey is a comprehensive coverage of algorithms for temporal
logic properties, including reward and multi-objective properties
not covered in [22], and an illustration of their practical applica-
tion on a tutorial-style example. Other surveys typically focus on
related classes of games, to mention concurrent games [71,47,61],
or only on a subclass of properties, e.g., single-objective [22].served.
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expressible in temporal logic. First, we consider quantitative
probabilistic properties over linear time, expressed as formulas of
probabilistic linear temporal logic. Examples of such properties
include ‘the maximum probability of the airbag failing to deploy
within 0.02 s is at most 106’, or ‘the minimum probability of the
car to reach its destination without colliding with pedestrians,
while obeying trafﬁc rules, is at least 1–1010’. Next, properties
reasoning about rewards associated with states of the game are
introduced. Namely, we consider the expected total and dis-
counted cumulative reward as well as long-run average reward.
These can be used to state properties such as ‘the minimum
expected proﬁt that the investor can guarantee within a year is at
least 1000’, or ‘the expected number of requests served per time
unit in the network is at least 5’. Finally, we allow to combine the
above linear-time and reward properties to express requirements
over branching time, thus allowing analysis of properties such as
‘the probability that the network recovers from a bad decision to a
state from which a consensus can be reached with probability at
least 0.9 is at least 0.95’.
Given a stochastic game and a property, veriﬁcation and
strategy synthesis problems, respectively, focus on the existence
and construction of a strategy for Player 1 that guarantees satis-
faction of the property against all strategies of Player 2. In this
work, we discuss general ﬁndings for the two problems and
overview the existing algorithmic solutions for various classes of
properties. The solutions typically rely on a reduction to simpler
games or properties, and the computation of optimal values and
strategies, for which a value iteration algorithm is typically uti-
lised. In the multi-player case, a coalition of players aims to
cooperatively enforce a property. Intuitively, multi-player sto-
chastic games can be seen as stochastic games with two players,
where the coalition acts as Player 1 and the remaining set of
players as Player 2. Finally, we analyse stochastic games with
respect to multi-objective properties that require simultaneous
satisfaction of multiple linear-time and reward properties. Here,
the properties can be conﬂicting and the techniques reduce to the
computation of an ε-approximation of the Pareto set of optimal
trade-offs between the individual properties.
While a number of software tools exist with partial support for
stochastic games, see Section 5 for a summary, they only allow a
subclass of such games, e.g., with one player or without stochas-
ticity, or perform analysis of stochastic games against single-
objective properties only. On the other hand, most of the over-
viewed algorithms have been implemented within the tool called
PRISM-games [36,55] for modelling, veriﬁcation, synthesis and
simulation of stochastic games, an extension of the PRISM model
checker [56]. We brieﬂy overview the features and functionality of
the tool and offer a number of case studies, where complex
computer systems have been modelled as stochastic games and
their properties analysed in PRISM-games.
Contributions of this paper can be summarised as follows:
 we present a comprehensive framework for analysis of
stochastic games, focusing on high-level temporal logic
speciﬁcations;
 we overview the existing body of knowledge and algorithmic
solutions for veriﬁcation and strategy synthesis problems for
stochastic games, and identify open problems;
 we offer a list of case studies of control systems that are mod-
elled and analysed through stochastic games.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section
2, we introduce stochastic games and deﬁne a speciﬁcation lan-
guage for linear-time and reward properties. In Section 3, we
formulate the veriﬁcation and strategy synthesis problems forsingle-objective properties, present general ﬁndings for the
problems, as well as algorithmic solutions, and their extensions
to branching-time properties and multi-player games. Multi-
objective combinations of properties are then discussed in
Section 4. We overview existing tools for games in Section 5 and
brieﬂy describe the functionality of PRISM-games, which cur-
rently provides the most comprehensive support for stochastic
games. Finally, we list several case studies that rely on stochastic
games in Section 6. We ﬁnish with concluding remarks in Section
7. To demonstrate the framework, an illustrative example mod-
elled and analysed in PRISM-games is used throughout the paper.2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
We use DðXÞ to denote the set of all probability distributions
over a set X. Given a ﬁnite or inﬁnite sequence λ of elements of X,
we use λi to denote its ith element for iZ0. For a ﬁnite sequence
λ¼ x0x1…xk of elements of X, we use jλj ¼ kþ1 to denote the
length of the sequence and lastðλÞ ¼ xk denotes its last element.
2.2. Stochastic gamesDeﬁnition 1 (Stochastic game). A turn-based 212-player game or
simply a stochastic game is a tuple G¼ ðS; ðS1; S2; SpÞ;ΔÞ, where S is
a ﬁnite set of states partitioned into sets S1, S2 and Sp of Player 1,
Player 2 and probabilistic states, respectively, and Δ : S  S-½0;1
is a probabilistic transition function such that, for states sAS1 [ S2,
it holds that Δðs; s0ÞAf0;1g for every s0AS, where we assume that
Δðs; s0Þ ¼ 1 for at least one s0AS, and for states sASp, it holdsP
s0A SΔðs; s0Þ ¼ 1.
Intuitively, the game is played as follows. The state of the game
is always determined uniquely and, in every step, the next state is
chosen according to the transition function. When the current
state of the game is a Player 1 state, i.e., sAS1, then Player
1 chooses the next state s0AS such that Δðs; s0Þ ¼ 1, and similarly
for Player 2. When the current state is probabilistic, i.e., sASp, the
next state of the game is sampled according to the distribution
Δðs; Þ.
Formally, a path of a game G is an inﬁnite sequence λ¼ s0s1…
such that Δðsi; siþ1Þ40 for all iZ0. A ﬁnite path of G is a ﬁnite
preﬁx of a path. We use PathG;s to denote the set of all paths ori-
ginating in a state sAS and PathG ¼ [ sA SPathG;s. The sets FPathG;s
; FPathG of ﬁnite paths are deﬁned analogously. Given two states
s; s0AS, we say that s0 is reachable from s if and only if there exists a
ﬁnite path λ such that λ0 ¼ s and lastðλÞ ¼ s0.
Deﬁnition 2 (Labelling function). Given a ﬁnite set of atomic pro-
positions AP, a labelling function L : S-2AP assigns to each state s
AS of the game a set of atomic propositions that hold true in s.
Deﬁnition 3 (Reward structure). Given a game G¼ ðS; ðS1; S2; SpÞ;ΔÞ,
a reward structure for G is a function r : S-ℝZ0 or r : S-ℝr0.
While the term reward intuitively suggests that the goal will be
to maximise functions over these values, we use a reward struc-
ture as a general value assignment and consider minimisation
problems as well. In such a case, the values are often referred to as
costs rather than rewards. By inverting the signature of all
rewards, the resulting function is again a reward structure, and
this will allow us to translate minimisation problems to max-
imisation. Note that, unless stated otherwise, in this work we do
not consider reward structures that assign both negative and
positive values.
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respect to reward properties in [50,58], as a special case of games
originally deﬁned by Shapley [71]. With respect to reachability
properties, simple stochastic games were studied in [40]. In a
simple stochastic game, every state has exactly two successors and
all transitions from probabilistic states have probability 0.5,
simulating a coin toss. More complex, temporal properties of
stochastic games were then introduced in [23].
Our deﬁnition of a stochastic game (Deﬁnition 1) is based on
the deﬁnition used, e.g., in [40,22]. An alternative way to deﬁne
such games is to partition the state space only into Player 1 and
Player 2 states and introduce a ﬁnite set of actions. The transition
function then deﬁnes at most one probability distribution for each
pair of a state and an action. A reward structure assigns values to
pairs of states and actions. Note that this deﬁnition of games,
appearing e.g., in [71,50], is equivalent to Deﬁnition 1.
Stochastic games include as a subclass many interesting and
widely studied models. If there are no probabilistic states, i.e.,
Sp ¼ 0/, the game is called a 2-player game or a non-stochastic
game. Similarly, if the game only has one player and probabilistic
states, i.e., S1 ¼ 0/ or S2 ¼ 0/, it is called a 112-player game or a Markov
decision process (MDP). Moreover, if also Sp ¼ 0/, the game is a
transition system. Finally, if both S1 ¼ 0/ and S2 ¼ 0/, the game
reduces to a Markov chain.
Deﬁnition 4 (Strategy). A Player 1 strategy is a tuple
π ¼ ðM;πu;πn;π initÞ, where M is a countable set of memory ele-
ments, πu : M  S-M is a memory update function, πn : M  S1-
DðSÞ is a next move function such that πnðm; sÞðs0Þ40 only if
Δðs; s0Þ40, and π init : S-M is an initial memory element function.
A Player 2 strategy σ ¼ ðM;σu;σn;σ initÞ is deﬁned analogously.
Intuitively, strategies prescribe the behaviour of players as
follows. Given a Player 1 strategy π, ﬁrst, an initial memory ele-
ment is chosen according to the function π init. Then, in every step
of the game, Player 1 updates the current memory element based
on the current state of the game, using the memory update
function πu. Moreover, if the game is in a Player 1 state, Player
1 chooses the next state of the game using the next move action
πn. Player 2 strategies are applied in an analogous way.
We use Π and Σ to denote the set of all Player 1 and Player
2 strategies, respectively. A (ﬁnite) path under strategies πAΠ;σ
AΣ is any (ﬁnite) path resulting from Player 1 playing according to
strategy π and Player 2 playing according to strategy σ. We use
notation Pathπ;σG ;Path
π;σ
G;s ; FPath
π;σ
G and FPath
π;σ
G;s with obvious
meaning.
Generally, a Player 1 strategy π is randomised. It is called pure if
the next move function πn is of type πn : M  S1-S. Similarly, π is
a memoryless strategy if M is a singleton, a ﬁnite memory strategy
if M is ﬁnite, and an inﬁnite memory strategy in the general case.
For simplicity, we consider pure memoryless strategies to be
functions of type π : S1-S. Player 2 strategies are classiﬁed in the
same way.
Let sAS be a state of a game G and let πAΠ;σAΣ be a Player
1 and Player 2 strategy, respectively. Given a ﬁnite path
λAFPathπ;σG;s , the cylinder set CylðλÞ is the set of all paths in Pathπ;σG;s
that have λ as a preﬁx. Consider the σ-algebra Σ of paths gener-
ated by the set of all such cylinder sets. According to classical
probability and measure theory [3], there exists a unique prob-
ability measure Prπ;σG;s over Σ such that
Prπ;σG;s ðCylðsÞÞ ¼ 1;
Prπ;σG;s ðCylðλÞÞ ¼ ∏
j λj 1
i ¼ 0
Δðλi; λiþ1Þ
for all λAFPathπ;σG;s . Given a random variable ρ over the probabilityspace ðPathπ;σG;s ;Σ;Prπ;σG;s Þ, the expected value of ρ is deﬁned as
Eπ;σG;s ðρÞ ¼
Z
Ω
ρ dPrπ;σG;s :
Deﬁnition 5 (Stopping game). A state sf AS of a stochastic game
G¼ ðS; ðS1; S2; SpÞ;ΔÞ is called terminal if and only if Δðsf ; sf Þ ¼ 1 and
Δðsf ; s0Þ ¼ 0 for all s0asf ; s0AS. A game is called stopping if it has at
least one terminal state and if it holds that, for every pair of
strategies πAΠ;σAΣ and every initial state, with probability
1 the game eventually stops, i.e., a terminal state is reached.
The principle of stopping games was introduced in [71], where
games were ﬁrst studied with respect to reward properties, to
avoid inﬁnite accumulation of rewards. The original deﬁnition
imposed a stronger assumption, not required for the results dis-
cussed here, that in every step the game stops with non-zero
probability. The more general notion of stopping as in Deﬁnition 5
appears, for example, in [40].
Note that we do not consider partial observability and assume
the games are ﬁnite. Several related, more general stochastic game
models exist, which include concurrent games [71,47,61], partial-
observation games [21] and uncertain (or bounded-parameter)
MDPs [62]. In particular, uncertain MDPs generalise stochastic
games to inﬁnite games by considering Player 2 with an inﬁnite
set of actions, typically deﬁned through convex uncertainty sets.
The motivation comes from the fact that, in many practical pro-
blems, estimating transition probabilities of systems with sto-
chastic uncertainty from data may be very difﬁcult but they can be
over-approximated using sets. These models have a strong con-
nection to partial-observation and concurrent games, see e.g.,
[57,80,67].
Example 1. Consider the stochastic game G¼ ðS; ðS1; S2; SpÞ;ΔÞ
depicted in Fig. 1(a). It can be seen as a simpliﬁed version of the
autonomous driving case study presented in [33]. The game
models a car driving in an urban area that is given a route to
navigate through. While navigating the route, it has to autono-
mously react to hazards. We consider two hazards, a trafﬁc jam
and a pedestrian. In order to avoid a hazard, the car chooses to
perform one of the three reactions, namely, change lane, honk or
brake. The game proceeds as follows. Starting from the probabil-
istic state s0, a hazard is encountered or the car successfully ﬁn-
ishes its route by entering the terminal state labelled with atomic
proposition succ, shown in green in Fig. 1(a). In the former case,
each of the two hazards appears with probability 0.3 and, with
probability 0.2, the choice of a hazard is left to Player 2. The out-
come of the three reactions to each hazard is indicated in Fig. 1(a).
For example, honking in the event of a trafﬁc jam results with
probability 0.05 in an accident, i.e., entering the red terminal state
labelled with proposition acc, and with probability 0.95 in suc-
cessfully resolving the hazard, i.e., returning back to state s0. The
results of braking in a trafﬁc jam, and changing lane and honking
when approaching a pedestrian are similar, with varying prob-
abilities of the individual transitions. In addition, braking when
approaching a pedestrian may have no effect on the hazard, i.e.,
with probability 0.16 the pedestrian remains a hazard and the car
can make a new choice of a reaction by returning back to state s3.
Finally, changing lane in a trafﬁc jam results in resolving the
hazard with probability 0.8 and, with probability 0.2, it results in a
violation of road rules, i.e., entering the grey terminal state labelled
with proposition viol. Note that the game G is a stopping game
since, regardless of Player 1 and Player 2 choices in their respective
Fig. 1. (a) Stochastic game modelling a car autonomously reacting to hazards on a road. Player 1, Player 2 and probabilistic states are depicted as squares, diamonds and
circles, respectively. Transition probabilities are indicated unless equal to 1. The set of atomic propositions is AP¼ fsucc; viol; accg and, for convenience, states with a non-
empty set of labels are also shown in colour. Hazards and reactions are indicated as annotations. (b) Two reward structures over G. States not shown in the table are assigned
value 0 in both reward structures. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this paper.)
Table 1
Semantics of properties deﬁned in Deﬁnition 6. Here, G is a stochastic game, sAS is
its state, L is a labelling function over a set of atomic propositions AP, Π and Σ are
the sets of Player 1 and Player 2 strategies, respectively, λ¼ λ0λ1…APathG is a path,
r is a reward structure on G and βA ð0;1Þ is a discount factor.
sFP⋈p½ψ  ⟺ (πAΠ such that
8σAΣ : Prπ;σG;s ðψ Þ ¼ Prπ;σG;s ðfλAPathG;s∣λFψgÞ⋈p
sFRr⋈x½ρ ⟺ (πAΠ such that 8σAΣ : Eπ;σG;s ðrewðr; ρÞÞ⋈x
λFtrue always
λFa ⟺ aALðλ0Þ
λF:ψ ⟺ λjψ
λFψ14ψ2 ⟺ λFψ14λFψ2
λFX ψ ⟺ λ1λ2…Fψ
λFψ1 U ψ2 ⟺ ( iZ0 : ðλiλiþ1…Fψ24 8 jo i : ðλjλjþ1…Fψ1ÞÞ
rewðr;CrkÞðλÞ ¼ Pki ¼ 0 rðλiÞ
rewðr;CÞðλÞ ¼ P1i ¼ 0 rðλiÞ
rewðr;Fn aÞðλÞ ¼ n if 8 iZ0 : a=2LðλiÞ and nAf0;1gP1
i ¼ 0 rðλiÞ if 8 iZ0 : a=2LðλiÞ and n¼ cPk1
i ¼ 0 rðλiÞ otherwise; where k¼minfi∣aALðλiÞg
8><
>:
rewðr;DβÞðλÞ ¼ P1i ¼ 0 βirðλiÞ
rewðr;SÞðλÞ ¼
lim infk-1
rewðr;CrkÞðλÞ
kþ1
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states labelled with proposition succ, viol or acc.
We consider two reward structures, renergy and rtime, over G
deﬁned in Fig. 1(b) that represent the energy and time demands of
individual reactions to hazards, respectively.
We modelled the game in the tool PRISM-games and analysed
it with respect to several properties. The corresponding input ﬁles
for PRISM-games can be found in [52], and we report on the
results in the following sections.
2.3. Properties
In this work, we are interested in both temporal and reward
properties of stochastic games. The speciﬁcation language deﬁned
below allows us to formulate such properties over linear time,
namely probabilistic linear-time properties, and various expected
reward functions. The language is motivated by the language used
by the PRISM model checker [56] and its extension for stochastic
games known as PRISM-games [36,55], based on probabilistic
Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) and its extension PCTLn [8], which
combines Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) together with the prob-
abilistic and reward operators in a CTL-like branching-time
fashion.
Deﬁnition 6 (Property). A property is a formula ϕ in the following
grammar:
ϕ :: ¼ P⋈p½ψ  ∣ Rr⋈x½ρ;
ψ :: ¼ true ∣ a ∣ :ψ ∣ ψ4ψ ∣ X ψ ∣ ψ U ψ ;
ρ :: ¼ Crk ∣ C ∣ Fn a ∣ Dβ ∣ S;
where aAAP is an atomic proposition, ⋈Afr ;o ;Z ;4g,
pA ½0;1, r is a reward structure, xAℝ, kAℕ0, nAf0;1; cg and
βAð0;1Þ.
The semantics of the properties is listed in Table 1. In particular,
formulas ϕ, i.e., the probabilistic and reward operator, are inter-
preted over states of the game, and linear temporal formulas ψ
and reward functions are interpreted over paths of the game.
Below, we give a brief description grouping properties from Deﬁ-
nition 6 into categories according to their syntactic form.Probabilistic reachability
Properties of the form P⋈p½F a, where F a¼ true U a, are called
probabilistic reachability properties. Given a state s, the property
requires that there exists a Player 1 strategy πAΠ such that, for all
Player 2 strategies σAΣ, the probability of reaching a state
labelled with atomic proposition a, starting from s, under the two
strategies satisﬁes the bound ⋈p. Probabilistic reachability prop-
erties represent a simple but fundamental class of properties since
many properties of games can be reduced to probabilistic reach-
ability. A step-bounded probabilistic reachability is a property of
the form P⋈p½Frk a, where kAℕ0;Frk a¼⋁ki ¼ 0Xi a and Xi is an
abbreviation for a sequence of i consecutive instances of the
operator X. In this case, the goal is to visit a state labelled with
atomic property a within the ﬁrst k steps of a path. Finally, prop-
erties of the form PZ1½F a are called almost-sure reachability
properties.
Probabilistic LTL
Properties of the form P⋈p½ψ  are generally referred to as
probabilistic LTL properties since, according to Deﬁnition 6, ψ can
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ingly often used in various areas of control as it is expressive
enough to describe many interesting properties of systems and, at
the same time, it resembles natural language statements. Exam-
ples of properties that can be expressed in LTL include reachability
F a, safety G a¼:F :a, liveness Gða ) F bÞ, persistent surveillance
GF a or stability FG a. Similar to probabilistic reachability, almost-
sure LTL properties are properties of the form PZ1½ψ .
Total reward properties
Properties of the form Rr⋈x½ρ, where ρ is equal to C;Crk or Fn a,
are called total reward properties. They are concerned with the
expected cumulative reward collected in states of the game over
inﬁnite time horizon (C), in the ﬁrst k steps of a path for kAℕ0
(Crk), or until a state labelled with proposition a is reached (Fn a).
In the latter case, if such a state is never visited, we allow to treat
the cumulative reward in different ways through the use of the
ﬂag n. Namely, we consider the reward being zero (n¼ 0), inﬁnity
(n¼1), or we allow the reward to accumulate indeﬁnitely (n¼ c).
Just as reachability properties are fundamental probabilistic
properties, total reward properties are fundamental reward
properties.
Discounted reward properties
Properties of the form Rr⋈x½Dβ analyse the expected cumulative
reward over inﬁnite time horizon, where the collected rewards are
increasingly discounted by the discount factor βAð0;1Þ.
Average reward properties
Finally, properties of the form Rr⋈x½S analyse the expected
average reward collected in states of the game over inﬁnite time
horizon.3. Single-objective game solving
In this section, we ﬁrst formulate the problem of solving a
stochastic game with respect to a property and discuss general
ﬁndings for this problem. Next, we overview the algorithmic
solutions for different types or properties. Finally, we discuss
extensions of these techniques to properties over branching time
and multi-player stochastic games.
3.1. Problem formulationProblem 1 (Veriﬁcation). Given a stochastic game G with an initial
state sAS, a set of atomic propositions AP and a labelling function
L, and a property over AP from Deﬁnition 6, i.e., ϕ¼ P⋈p½ψ  or
ϕ¼ R⋈x½ρ, does it hold that sFϕ?
Problem 2 (Strategy synthesis). Given a stochastic game G with an
initial state sAS, a set of atomic propositions AP and a labelling
function L, and a property over AP from Deﬁnition 6, i.e., ϕ¼ P⋈p
½ψ  or ϕ¼ R⋈x½ρ, construct a Player 1 strategy πAΠ (if it exists)
that is a witness to the satisfaction sFϕ.
A Player 1 strategy that is a solution to Problem 2 is called a
winning Player 1 strategy. Conversely, Player 2 aims to violate the
property ϕ and a winning Player 2 strategy is such that, for all
Player 1 strategies, the property is not satisﬁed. Games with this
semantics are called zero-sum games since the objectives of the
two players are complementary.
In order to solve both veriﬁcation and strategy synthesis pro-
blems, we consider the optimal values of path formulas ψ andreward functions ρ from Deﬁnition 6 deﬁned as follows:
PrminG;s ðψ Þ ¼ infπAΠsupσAΣ
Prπ;σG;s ðψ Þ;
PrmaxG;s ðψ Þ ¼ sup
πAΠ
inf
σAΣ
Prπ;σG;s ðψ Þ;
EminG;s ðrewðr;ρÞÞ ¼ infπAΠsupσAΣ
Eπ;σG;s ðrewðr;ρÞÞ;
EmaxG;s ðrewðr;ρÞÞ ¼ sup
πAΠ
inf
σAΣ
Eπ;σG;s ðrewðr;ρÞÞ: ð1Þ
A Player 1 strategy πAΠ starting from state s is called optimal if it
achieves the optimal value, e.g., supσAΣPr
π;σ
G;s ðψ Þ ¼ PrminG;s ðψ Þ.
Similarly, the strategy is called ε-optimal, for ε40, if it achieves a
value deviating by at most ε from the optimum, e.g.,
supσAΣPr
π;σ
G;s ðψ ÞZPrminG;s ðψ Þþε.
A stochastic game is called determined with respect to a chosen
optimality criterion if the corresponding equality holds:
PrminG;s ðψ Þ ¼ sup
σAΣ
inf
πAΠ
Prπ;σG;s ðψ Þ;
PrmaxG;s ðψ Þ ¼ infσAΣ supπAΠ
Prπ;σG;s ðψ Þ;
EminG;s ðrewðr;ρÞÞ ¼ sup
σAΣ
inf
πAΠ
Eπ;σG;s ðrewðr;ρÞÞ;
EmaxG;s ðrewðr;ρÞÞ ¼ infσAΣ supπAΠ
Eπ;σG;s ðrewðr;ρÞÞ:
Determinacy also guarantees existence of ε-optimal strategies for
all ε40 for both players from every state. A deep result in [60]
established determinacy for a large class of games including sto-
chastic games with respect to any Borel measurable property and,
in particular, with respect to all properties in Deﬁnition 6.
Note that determinacy does not necessarily imply the existence
of optimal strategies. However, for all classes of properties
described in Section 2.3 it has been shown that both players have
optimal strategies and pure memoryless strategies sufﬁce, except
for the step-bounded properties, the class of general probabilistic
LTL properties and total reward properties with ρ¼ F0 a, where
pure ﬁnite-memory strategies may be required, see [2,22,35] and
references therein. The optimal values and strategies can be used
to solve the veriﬁcation problem stated in Problem 1 in the fol-
lowing way. For example, to solve the veriﬁcation problem for G; s
and property PZp½ψ , it sufﬁces to verify that PrmaxG;s ðψ ÞZp. The
remaining properties in Deﬁnition 6 can be addressed in an ana-
logous way. To solve the strategy synthesis problem stated in
Problem 2, we compute an optimal or a suitable ε-optimal Player
1 strategy. Together with the existence of optimal strategies, this
implies that, for every property in Deﬁnition 6, there exists a
winning strategy for one of the players.
To directly address the computation of optimal values and
strategies, we extend the syntax of properties to include numerical
queries for computing optimal strategies.
Deﬁnition 7 (Numerical query). Let ψ, r and ρ be as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 6. Numerical queries Pmin ¼ ?½ψ , Pmax ¼ ?½ψ , Rrmin ¼ ?½ρ
and Rrmax ¼ ?½ρ aim to compute the optimal values deﬁned in
Eq. (1), respectively, together with the corresponding optimal
Player 1 strategies.
As discussed above, the problem of computing the optimal
values for states, called quantitative query solving, and constructing
an optimal Player 1 strategy, called strategic query solving, are two
separate problems utilised to solve the veriﬁcation and strategy
synthesis problems for games. In [2], it has been shown that all
problems of quantitative and strategic query solving for prob-
abilistic reachability, total, discounted as well as average reward
properties are polynomially equivalent, i.e., there exists a
polynomial-time reduction between the problems. The computa-
tional complexity of these problems is NP \ coNP. No polynomial-
time algorithm is known, even for reachability objectives, and the
Fig. 2. Value iteration algorithm for the probabilistic reachability numerical query Pmax ¼ ?½F a.
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quantitative query solving problems, i.e., computing the optimal
values for states, is a value iteration algorithm, presented in detail
later in this section. It is not necessarily true that the strategic
solution can be easily derived from the quantitative solution, i.e.,
an optimal strategy might not be easily constructed from the
optimal values. For the case of probabilistic reachability, total and
discounted reward this nevertheless is the case, and optimal
strategies can be constructed from the optimal values in linear
time. For average reward properties, the existence of a similar
(even polynomial-time) algorithm remains an open question [2].
In the following Sections 3.2–3.6, we discuss algorithmic
solutions to the veriﬁcation and strategy synthesis problems for
properties in Deﬁnition 6 as classiﬁed in Section 2.3. Firstly, note
that from determinacy we get
PrminG;s ðψ Þ ¼ 1PrmaxG;s ð:ψ Þ;
EminG;s ðrewðr;ρÞÞ ¼EmaxG;s ðrewðr;ρÞÞ;
and hence it sufﬁces to discuss maximisation numerical queries. In
Section 3.7, we discuss a generalisation of these techniques to a
logic that combines properties from Deﬁnition 6 in a PCTLn-like
fashion to obtain properties over branching time. Finally, Section
3.8 overviews an extension of veriﬁcation and strategy synthesis
for stochastic games with two players to general, multi-player
stochastic games.
3.2. Probabilistic reachability
Consider the numerical reachability query Pmax ¼ ?½F a for a
game G with an initial state sAS. To quantitatively solve the query,
we can use an adaptation of the value iteration algorithm that ﬁrst
appeared in [40] for simple stochastic games deﬁned in Section
2.2. The algorithm computes the optimal values for Player 1 states
sAS1 as
PrmaxG;s ðF aÞ ¼ vnðsÞ ¼ limn-1v
n
nðsÞ; ð2Þ
where vnnðsÞ is iteratively computed as indicated in Fig. 2. While the
limit may not converge in ﬁnite time, a precision threshold α can
be computed such that, if the value iteration algorithm is termi-
nated once the maximum difference between vnnðsÞ and vnnþ1ðsÞ, for
sAS, is not more than α, the limit values can be obtained by simple
rounding [25]. Moreover, using this procedure, the algorithm
always stops in a number of iterations that is at most exponential
in the size of the game. It was proven in [2] that, given the
quantitative solution to the query, the necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for the strategic solution, i.e., a pure memoryless opti-
mal Player 1 strategy πn, are the following. First, an optimal
strategy πn satisﬁes, for every sAS1, the set membership
πnðsÞAarg max
s0AS
Δðs; s0Þ  vnðs0Þ; ð3Þ
and second, under πn, the game reaches a state labelled with
proposition a with non-zero probability starting from any state s
AS such that vnðsÞ40, under any Player 2 strategy. An optimal
Player 1 strategy can be constructed from the optimal values intime linear in the size of the game using a technique called ret-
rograde analysis, ﬁrst introduced in the artiﬁcial intelligence
community to solve chess endgames [74]. Intuitively, the strategy
is computed from states labelled with a, using backward propa-
gation. For details of the construction, see [2].
The minimisation queries Pmin ¼ ?½F a can be solved analo-
gously. The value iteration algorithm can also be used for a ﬁxed
number of iterations to approximate the optimal values and
strategy. For example, to solve the strategy synthesis problem for
properties of type PZp½F a, the maximisation query is considered
and value iteration is terminated once the value vnnðsÞ is greater or
equal to p for the chosen state sAS and the corresponding Player
1 strategy is then computed in a way similar to the optimal
case above.
Besides the value iteration algorithm, one can adapt the
equations from Fig. 2 to design a quadratic program and a strategy
iteration algorithm that iterates over pure memoryless strategies
[41]. For a chosen Player 1 strategy πAΠ, the strategy iteration
algorithm computes the optimal values vnπ obtainable by Player 2 if
Player 1 plays according to π, and then the algorithm locally
improves π to achieve better values for Player 1. While the best
known bound for the number of iterations is exponential, the
algorithm performs well in practice and no class of games is
known for which an exponential number of iterations is required.
Finally, there also exists a randomised subexponential-time
algorithm to solve the problem. For simple stochastic games, it
was introduced in [59] and can be extended to general stochastic
games as shown in [12]. Intuitively, the algorithm randomly tries
to guess the optimal transition in a chosen Player 1 state of the
game and veriﬁes whether the best strategy with the chosen
transition is optimal. If not, it removes the transition and proceeds.
For the special case of almost-sure reachability properties
PZ1½F a, the strategy synthesis problem can be solved in quad-
ratic time as follows. The problem is ﬁrst reduced to an equivalent
strategy synthesis problem for a 2-player, non-stochastic game
with a reachability property as shown in [26], which is then solved
using a simple graph algorithm, see, e.g., [22] and references
therein.
For step-bounded numerical reachability queries Pmin ¼ ?½Frk a
and Pmax ¼ ?½Frk a, pure ﬁnite-memory strategies need to be
considered. Intuitively, longer paths with higher probability of
reaching a state labelled with proposition a may be preferred
when enough time remains until the deadline k, whereas shorter
paths with lower probability might need to be considered when
the deadline is approaching. The optimal values and a Player
1 strategy for a game G can be computed by performing a ﬁxed
number k of iterations of the value iteration algorithm on the
game Grk that is an extension of the game G to keep track of the
number of steps performed. Formally, Grk has states of the form
(s,i), where sAS and iAf0;1;…; kg, and the transition function is
Δrkððs; iÞ; ðs0; iþ1ÞÞ ¼Δrkððs; kÞ; ðs0; kÞÞ ¼Δðs; s0Þ
for s; s0AS and iok. It is easy to see that, indeed,
PrmaxG;s ðFrk aÞ ¼ vnkððs;0ÞÞ.
Fig. 4. Value iteration algorithm for the total reward numerical query Rrmax ¼ ? ½C.
Fig. 3. Optimal values obtained for step-bounded numerical query Pmax ¼ ? ½Frk
succ for the game introduced in Example 1.
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reachability to reward properties. The strategy synthesis problem
for a game G, state sAS and probabilistic reachability property P⋈p
½F a can be reduced to strategy synthesis for a game G0, s and a
total reward property Rr⋈p½Fc a, where the game G0 is G with a new
probabilistic terminal state sf. The transitions of all states sAS
labelled with proposition a are deﬁned as Δðs; sf Þ ¼ 1 and Δðs; s0Þ
¼ 0 otherwise. The reward structure is deﬁned as rðsÞ ¼ 1 for all
sAS labelled with a and rðsÞ ¼ 0 otherwise.
Example 2. Recall the autonomous car example introduced in
Example 1, modelled with the stochastic game G shown in Fig. 1
(a) with starting state s0ASp. Consider the numerical query Pmax ¼ ?
½F succ to determine the maximal probability of reaching a state
labelled with proposition succ indicating that the car successfully
ﬁnished the route. The maximal probability is approximately 0.87
and the corresponding pure memoryless optimal strategy is to
brake for both hazards. Next, consider the step-bounded numer-
ical query Pmax ¼ ?½Frk succ. We computed results for step bounds
1rkr30. The optimal values can be observed in Fig. 3. For kr3,
the only way for the car to successfully ﬁnish the route in at most
3 steps starting from s0 is not to encounter any hazards, and thus
the maximum probability is 0.2. For k¼4 and k¼5, the maximum
probability is approximately 0.32 and 0.35, respectively, and there
exists a pure memoryless optimal strategy that always brakes in a
trafﬁc jam and honks when approaching a pedestrian. Finally, for
kZ6, the maximum probability is gradually increasing with k and,
here, optimal strategies are pure, but require ﬁnite memory. To be
speciﬁc, an optimal strategy is to always brake in a trafﬁc jam, and
when approaching a pedestrian react as follows. If at most 4 or at
least 6 steps remain until the bound k, then honk. If exactly 5 steps
remain to successfully ﬁnish the route, then brake.
3.3. Probabilistic LTL
The standard approach to solving numerical queries of the form
Pmax ¼ ?½ψ  with an arbitrary LTL formula ψ is to translate the for-
mula ψ into a deterministic Rabin automaton [13] of the size up to
doubly exponential in the size of the formula. Since LTL formulas
considered in control are typically small, the size of the corre-
sponding automaton is manageable. The synchronous product of
the game G and the automaton is a Rabin stochastic game. Such
games can be solved by combining the value iteration algorithmfor reachability queries with any algorithm for Rabin non-
stochastic games as presented in [27]. Alternatively, the determi-
nistic Rabin automaton can be translated to a different type of
automaton called a parity automaton [9] and the product parity
stochastic game can be solved using the strategy iteration or
randomised subexponential algorithm presented in [28].
Similarly as for the reachability properties, the problem of
solving a stochastic game with respect to an almost-sure LTL
property PZ1½ψ  can be solved by reducing the corresponding
almost-sure Rabin stochastic game to an equivalent Rabin
2-player, non-stochastic game [26]. An overview of existing algo-
rithms, exponential and deterministic subexponential, for non-
stochastic Rabin games can be found in [22].
Example 3. Consider the safety numerical query Pmax ¼ ?½G:acc
for the autonomous car example from Example 1. The query aims
to compute the maximum probability with which an accident can
be avoided. The maximum probability is approximately 0.92,
which is higher than the maximum probability of successfully
ﬁnishing the route computed in Example 2. The reason is that
violation of road rules is not considered an accident. There exists a
pure memoryless optimal strategy, namely, to change lane in a
trafﬁc jam and to brake when approaching a pedestrian.
3.4. Total reward properties
To solve the numerical query Rrmax ¼ ?½ρ, techniques similar to
those for probabilistic reachability as described in Section 3.2 can
be applied.
First, let ρ¼ C and assume that the considered game is stop-
ping, all rewards are non-negative r : S-ℝZ0 and terminal states
have reward 0. This means that the expected total reward is
always ﬁnite. The optimal values for Player 1 states sAS1 are
deﬁned as
EmaxG;s ðrewðr;CÞÞ ¼ vnðsÞ ¼ limn-1v
n
nðsÞ; ð4Þ
where vnnðsÞ is iteratively computed as indicated in Fig. 4. Similarly
as for the value iteration in Section 3.2, the limit is not guaranteed
to converge in ﬁnite time, but using a precision threshold the limit
values can be computed in a number of iterations that is at most
exponential in the size of the game [25]. Unlike in the reachability
case, since the game is assumed to be stopping, there is only
one necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a (pure memoryless)
optimal Player 1 strategy πn. Namely, for every state sAS1, it must
hold that
πnðsÞAarg max
s0AS
Δðs; s0Þ  vnðs0Þ: ð5Þ
An optimal strategy can thus be constructed from the optimal
values in linear time using the above equations. Maximisation
queries with non-positive rewards r : S-ℝr0, as well as mini-
misation queries, can be solved in an analogous way, and the value
iteration can be used for a ﬁxed number of iterations to approx-
imate the optimal value and strategy to solve properties of the
type ϕ¼ Rr⋈x½C.
For non-stopping games, the set of states that receive inﬁnite
total reward can be computed by solving the game with respect to
a parity condition [73]. After removing these states, value iteration
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for the remaining states.
Next, let ρ¼ Fn a. For n¼ c, the query can be reduced to the
case above, with ρ¼ C, by adding a new terminal state sf with rð
sf Þ ¼ 0 and altered transitions for states s such that aALðsÞ by
letting Δðs; sf Þ ¼ 1 and Δðs; s0Þ ¼ 0 otherwise. For n¼1, we proceed
in a similar fashion. However, while value iteration in Fig. 4
computes the least ﬁxed point, in this case we need to compute
the greatest ﬁxed point as zero reward paths that do not reach a
state labelled with proposition a need to be identiﬁed. This can be
done using computation in Fig. 4 for an altered game, where all
zero rewards are changed to an arbitrary ε40 [35]. Finally, for
n¼ 0, the optimal strategy may depend on the rewards accumu-
lated so far and pure ﬁnite memory strategies sufﬁce for Player
1 to win. The computation combines value iteration algorithms
from Figs. 2 and 4, see [35] for details.
Step-bounded numerical queries with ρ¼ Crk can be solved
using a ﬁxed number k of iterations of the value iteration algo-
rithm on the game Grk deﬁned in Section 3.2 and optimal stra-
tegies might thus require memory.
Example 4. For the autonomous car in Example 1, we compute
the minimum expected total energy and time demands before
successful route completion, Rrenergymin ¼ ?½Fc succ and Rrtimemin ¼ ?½Fc succ.
For energy, the minimum value is approximately 3.33 with the
pure memoryless optimal strategy to honk for both hazards. For
time, the minimum value is approximately 2.71 with the pure
memoryless optimal strategy to change lane for both hazards. Note
that changing lane in a trafﬁc jam might violate trafﬁc rules,
resulting in entering the grey terminal state in Fig. 1(a). While in
such a case the route cannot be successfully completed any more,
the time cost drops to 0 for all the following steps, and thus
changing lane, while potentially violating road rules, results in
lower expected total time. In comparison, if the time cost assigned
to the terminal state corresponding to trafﬁc rules violation was 1,
the optimal strategy would be to brake in a trafﬁc jam and change
lane when approaching a pedestrian with the expected total time
approximately 3.46.
3.5. Discounted reward properties
To solve numerical queries of the form Rrmax ¼ ?½Dβ, we present
their reduction to probabilistic reachability queries [2], as well as
to total reward queries [34].
Let G be a stochastic game with a reward structure r. First, we
describe the reduction to probabilistic reachability. Without loss of
generality, assume that all rewards take values in the interval ½0;1.
Construct a game G0 ¼ ðS0; ðS1; S2; S0pÞ;Δ0Þ deﬁned as follows. First,
add two terminal probabilistic states s0; s1AS
0
p. Next, for every
Player 1 or Player 2 state sAS1 [ S2 and every s0AS such that
Δðs; s0Þ ¼ 1, we add a new probabilistic state ts;s0AS0p and deﬁne
Δ0ðs; ts;s0 Þ ¼ 1;Δ0ðs; s0Þ ¼ 0. For probabilistic states ts;s0 , we let
Δ0ðts;s0 ; tÞ ¼
βð1rðsÞÞ if t ¼ s0;
βrðsÞ if t ¼ s1;
1β if t ¼ s0;
0 otherwise:
8>><
>>:
Finally, for probabilistic states sASp we deﬁne
Δ0ðs; s0Þ ¼
βð1rðsÞÞ if s0 ¼ s0;
βrðsÞ if s0 ¼ s1;
ð1βÞΔðs; s0Þ otherwise:
8><
>:
Consider AP¼ fag and the labelling function deﬁned as Lðs1Þ ¼ fag
and LðsÞ ¼ ϕ otherwise. It holds that every optimal strategy for G0
with respect to the numerical query Pmax ¼ ?½F a is also an optimal
strategy for G with respect to the numerical query Rrmax ¼ ?½Dβ.Next, we present a reduction to total reward queries that builds
on the same principles. Construct a game G0 ¼ ðS0; ðS1; S2; S0pÞ;Δ0Þ and
a reward structure r0 deﬁned as follows. First, for every sAS1 [ S2
add a new probabilistic state tsAS
0
p and add a new terminal prob-
abilistic state sf AS
0
p. For all states s; s
0AS such that Δðs; s0Þ40 deﬁne
Δ0ðs; ts0 Þ ¼Δðs; s0Þ;Δ0ðs; s0Þ ¼ 0. For probabilistic states ts, we let
Δ0ðts; tÞ ¼
β if t ¼ sf ;
1β if t ¼ s;
0 otherwise:
8><
>:
The reward structure r0 is such that r0ðsÞ ¼ rðsÞ for sAS and the
reward is 0 otherwise. It holds that every optimal strategy for G0
with respect to numerical query Rr
0
max ¼ ?½C is also an optimal
strategy for G with respect to the numerical query Rrmax ¼ ?½Dβ.
3.6. Average reward properties
Unlike other inﬁnite horizon properties such as total reward,
expected average reward disregards all transient behaviour.
Nevertheless, it was proven in [50,58] that pure memoryless
strategies still sufﬁce for both players to win. In [58], the authors
show that, for a game G with an average reward numerical query
Rrmax ¼ ?½S, there exists a discount factor β such that any strategy
optimal in G with respect to discounted reward numerical query
Rrmax ¼ ?½Dβ is also optimal with respect to the average reward
query. Moreover, for a strategy to be optimal for the latter, it suf-
ﬁces if it is optimal for the former for every β sufﬁciently close to 1.
The authors in [2] then compute a concrete value of the discount
factor and prove that a solution to numerical queries of the
form Rrmax ¼ ?½S can be found as a solution to numerical query
Rrmax ¼ ?½Dβ for any βA ½βn;1Þ, where
βn ¼ 1 ðn!Þ2  22nþ3  r2n2max
 1
;
n¼ jSj ;
rmax ¼max
sAS
rðsÞ:
Alternatively, it has been shown in [10] that, unlike for the
general case, for stochastic games that are ergodic, i.e., the optimal
average reward is independent of an initial state of the game,
optimal strategies can be constructed using locally optimal moves.
The algorithm reduces the game, using a potential transformation,
to a canonical form in which the locally optimal moves are also
globally optimal. The algorithm is pseudo-polynomial if the game
has a constant number of probabilistic states, and otherwise it can
be up to exponential in the number of probabilistic states.
Finally, for a related property called an almost-sure average
reward property, where the aim is to achieve a certain average
reward with probability 1 (as opposed to the expected average),
one can use the approach presented in [6]. As the algorithm was
primarily designed to solve games with respect to a conjunction of
such properties, we discuss the property and the approach in more
detail in Section 4.7.
3.7. Branching-time properties
The deﬁnition of properties in Deﬁnition 6 allows one to reason
about probabilistic and expected reward properties of games over
linear time. Below, we extend the deﬁnition to branching time by
combining properties in a PCTLn-like fashion. The resulting logic
has been introduced and studied in [35,73].
Deﬁnition 8 (Branching-time property). A branching-time prop-
erty is a formula ϕ in the following grammar:
ϕ :: ¼ true∣a∣:ϕ∣ϕ4ϕ∣P⋈p½ψ ∣Rr⋈x½Fnϕ;
ψ :: ¼ϕ∣true∣a∣:ψ ∣ψ4ψ ∣X ψ ∣ψ U ψ ;
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pA ½0;1, ris a reward structure, xAℝ, and nAf0;1; cg.
Note that, unlike in Deﬁnition 6, here we only allow ρ¼ Fn a for
the reward operator Rr⋈x½ρ. The semantics for branching-time
properties is as shown in Table 1, with formulas ϕ being inter-
preted over states sAS of the game G, and formulas ψ being
interpreted over paths λAPathG of the game. For completeness,
the deﬁnitions not shown in Table 1 are given as follows:
sFtrue always;
sFa ⟺ aALðsÞ;
sF:ϕ ⟺ sjϕ;
sFϕ14ϕ2⟺sFϕ1 and sFϕ2;
λFϕ ⟺ λ0Fϕ:
The problem of veriﬁcation for branching-time properties is
formulated in a way analogous to Problem 1. Given a game G, its
state s and a branching-time property ϕ, the veriﬁcation problem
can be solved similar to PCTLn model checking for MDPs [8].
Intuitively, the solution is achieved by traversing the parse tree of
ϕ in a bottom-up fashion. Iteratively, the innermost subformulas,
which are either probabilistic LTL properties or total reward
properties, are solved using techniques discussed in Sections 3.2–
3.4, and replaced by new atomic propositions such that a state is
labelled with the new proposition if and only if the answer to
Problem 1 for the corresponding property is ‘yes’. For full
description, see [73].
On the other hand, the formulation of the strategy synthesis
problem in Problem 2 does not extend to branching-time prop-
erties in a straightforward way. For example, for a formula
ϕ¼ P⋈p1 ½ψ14P⋈p2 ½ψ2, the semantics implies that sFϕ if there
exists a Player 1 strategy π1AΠ such that, for all Player 2 strate-
gies σAΣ, it holds Prπ1 ;σG;s ðψ1Þ⋈p1, and, at the same time, there
exists a Player 1 strategy π2AΠ (possibly different than π1) such
that, for all Player 2 strategies σAΣ, it holds Prπ2 ;σG;s ðψ2Þ⋈p2. This
means that, even if the satisfaction sFϕ holds, there may not
exist a single Player 1 strategy that is a witness to it. While the
problem of strategy synthesis cannot be formulated in this way for
the full logic from Deﬁnition 8, there exist branching-time prop-
erties for which the problem can be formulated and is indeed
interesting. For example, consider a formula ϕ¼ P⋈p½F R⋈x½Fc a
which states that, starting from a state sAS, there exists a Player
1 strategy π1 such that, with probability that satisﬁes the bound p
and under any Player 2 strategy, the game reaches a state s0AS
from which there exists a (possibly different) Player 1 strategy π2
that guarantees that the expected total reward before reaching a
state labelled with proposition a satisﬁes the bound x. Note that, if
indeed sFϕ, a witness to this satisfaction is the strategy π1 and
the strategy π2 does not need to be constructed. In [73], the author
discussed the strategy synthesis problem for a fragment of
branching-time properties in Deﬁnition 8. To be speciﬁc, an algo-
rithm is described to synthesise a winning Player 1 strategy for
branching-time properties of the form P⋈p½ψ  and R⋈x½Fn ϕ.
Similar to the veriﬁcation case above, the algorithm is based on
traversing the parse tree of the formula and constructing strategies
for probabilistic LTL and total reward properties using techniques
from Sections 3.2 to 3.4.
Remark 1. The semantics of branching-time properties can also
be deﬁned in a different way as follows. First, let the properties in
Deﬁnition 6 be interpreted over Markov chains rather than over
states of a game. More formally, given a game G, its state sAS, a
Player 1 strategy πAΠ, and a Player 2 strategy σAΣ, we let G; s;
π;σFP⋈p½ψ  if and only if Prπ;σG;s ðψ Þ⋈p, and the semantics for the
reward operator Rr⋈x½ρ is deﬁned in an analogous way. Given a
state sAS and a property ϕ¼ P⋈p½ψ  or ϕ¼ Rr⋈x½ρ, the veriﬁcationproblem then asks for existence of a Player 1 strategy π such that,
for all Player 2 strategies σ, it holds G; s;π;σFϕ, and, likewise, the
strategy synthesis problem aims to construct such a Player
1 strategy. This semantics of properties can be straightforwardly
extended to branching-time properties in Deﬁnition 8. For exam-
ple, for a formula ϕ¼ϕ14ϕ2, it holds that G; s;π;σFϕ if and only
if G; s;π;σFϕ1 and G; s;π;σFϕ2. Especially, note the difference
between this semantics of a conjunction and the semantics given
earlier in this section, after Deﬁnition 8. Both formulations of the
veriﬁcation and strategy synthesis problems can now be directly
extended from simple linear-time and reward properties to
branching-time properties. The problems are, however, very
intricate. It has been shown in [16] that, already for PCTL, a frag-
ment of the above branching-time properties with the probabil-
istic operator, the games are generally not determined. That means
that there might exist states of the games from which neither of
the two players has a winning strategy. Moreover, winning stra-
tegies may require (possibly inﬁnite) memory and/or randomisa-
tion. Therefore, it makes sense to formulate the veriﬁcation and
strategy synthesis problems for speciﬁc subclasses of strategies,
e.g., pure ﬁnite-memory or randomised inﬁnite-memory strate-
gies. In [16], the authors prove several complexity results for the
veriﬁcation problem with restricted classes of properties and
strategies, including an undecidability result for a simple fragment
of PCTL and ﬁnite-memory strategies.3.8. Stochastic games with multiple players
The deﬁnition of a stochastic game in Deﬁnition 1 can be
extended to a multi-player stochastic game as follows.
Deﬁnition 9 (Multi-player stochastic game). A multiplayer sto-
chastic game is a tuple G¼ ðS; ðS1;…; Sn; SpÞ;ΔÞ, where S is a ﬁnite
set of states partitioned into a set of probabilistic states Sp and sets
S1;…; Sn of states of Players 1 to n, respectively. Probabilistic
transition function Δ : S  S-½0;1 is such that for all states sA
⋃1r irnSi it holds that Δððs; s0ÞÞAf0;1g for every s0AS, and for
probabilistic states sASp we have
P
s0ASΔððs; s0ÞÞ ¼ 1.
A strategy for Player iAf1;…;ng is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 4. A
strategy for a coalition of players CDf1;…;ng consists of a set of
strategies for the players in the coalition, one for each player.
Deﬁnitions of linear- and branching-time properties in Deﬁnitions
6 and 8 can be extended to consider coalitions of players CDf
1;…;ng using syntax 〈〈C〉〉ϕ. For branching-time properties, the
resulting logic is called rPATLn; for detailed deﬁnition of the
semantics, see [35,73]. Intuitively, multi-player veriﬁcation and
strategy synthesis problems ask whether and how players of the
coalition C can cooperatively guarantee satisfaction of the property
ϕ. These problems reduce to the corresponding Problems 1 and 2
for the stochastic game with two players, where Player 1 repre-
sents the collective behaviour of the coalition C and Player
2 represents the remaining players f1;…;ng⧹C.4. Multi-objective game solving
In this section, we discuss the problem of strategy synthesis,
where the goal is to simultaneously satisfy a certain combination
of properties of the form in Deﬁnition 6.
Fig. 5. Iterative computation of an ε-approximation of the Pareto set for a multi-objective total reward property. Here, xARZ0 is a real number, xARmZ0 is a vector, XDR
m
Z0
is a set, and r is the componentwise partial order on RmZ0. Given a stopping game G with multiple reward structures r and a multi-objective total reward property ΦðxÞ, the
approximation is computed for every state sAS in k¼ jSj þ⌈jSj  lnðεðnMÞ  1 Þlnð1δÞ ⌉ iterations, where M ¼ jSj 
maxi;sA S ri ðsÞ
δ , δ¼ Δj S jmin, and Δmin is the smallest positive probability in G.
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erty Φ is a conjunction of properties of the form PZp½ψ  and
RrZx½ρ.
The semantics of a multi-objective property involving n prob-
abilistic properties and m reward properties, i.e.,
Φ¼ ⋀
n
i ¼ 1
PZpi ½ψ i4 ⋀
m
j ¼ 1
R
rj
Zxj ½ρj
is deﬁned over states sAS of a game G as follows. It holds that
sFΦ if and only if there exists a Player 1 strategy πAΠ such that,
for all Player 2 strategies and 1r irn, it holds Prπ;σG;s ðψ iÞZpi, and
similarly, for all Player 2 strategies and 1r jrm, it holds
Eπ;σG;s ðrewðrj;ρjÞÞZrj. Note that, while such a conjunction is syn-
tactically a branching-time property according to Deﬁnition 8, its
semantics is different. In fact, the semantics of a multi-objective
property is in line with the alternative semantics of branching-
time properties discussed in Remark 1.
Every property of the form Rrrx½ρ is equivalent to property
R rZ  x½ρ and, similarly, every property of the form Prp½ψ  is
equivalent to PZ1p½:ψ . Thus, the above deﬁnition of a multi-
objective property covers conjunctions of all properties from
Deﬁnition 6.
While in Deﬁnition 10 we deﬁne multi-objective properties
only as conjunctions (unlike, e.g., in [32], where any positive
Boolean combinations are allowed), we address more complex
combinations for some classes of properties further in this section.
Let Φ be a multi-objective property involving n probabilistic
properties and m reward properties. For simplicity, we use r¼ ðr1
;…; rmÞ to denote the vector of reward structures and
rðsÞ ¼ ðr1ðsÞ;…; rmðsÞÞ, for every sAS. Similarly, p¼ ðp1;…; pnÞ and
x¼ ðx1;…; xmÞ denote the vectors of probability and reward
bounds. Instead of Φ, we sometimes write Φðp; xÞ to emphasise
the corresponding bounds. We say that Φðp; xÞ, or the vector of
bounds ðp; xÞ for Φ, is achievable if and only if there exists a
winning strategy for Player 1 that guarantees all properties in Φ
with bounds p,x. The optimal achievable vectors of bounds are
called Pareto vectors.
Deﬁnition 11 (Pareto set). Let Φ be a multi-objective property
involving n probabilistic and m reward properties. A vector ðp; xÞ
Aℝnþm is called a Pareto vector if the property Φðpε; xεÞ is
achievable for every ε40 and Φðpþε; xþεÞ is not achievable for
any ε40. Pareto set P is the set of all Pareto vectors for Φ.
The problems of multi-objective veriﬁcation and strategy
synthesis are formulated analogously to the single-objective case
stated in Problems 1 and 2. Unlike in the single-objective case,
optimal strategies might not exist. This is already true, forexample, for precise-value games, where the objective is to achieve
a precise value (related to probability or reward). Such a property
can be expressed as a conjunction of two single-objective prop-
erties, and it has been shown in [34] that, in these games, a
winning strategy may not exist for either of the two players.
In this section, we discuss existing solutions to multi-objective
strategy synthesis depending on what type of properties are being
combined. The solutions compute ε-approximations of Pareto sets
and the corresponding ε-optimal strategies.
Deﬁnition 12 (Pareto set approximation). For ε40, an ε-approx-
imation of the Pareto set is a set of vectors Q such that for every
ðq; yÞAQ there exists a Pareto vector ðp; xÞAP with
J ðq; yÞðp; xÞJrε, and vice versa, for every Pareto vector ðp; xÞAP
there exists a vector ðq; yÞAQ with J ðq;yÞðp;xÞJrε, where J  J
is the Manhattan distance deﬁned as the sum of componentwise
differences.
4.2. Multi-objective total reward properties
Here we discuss the strategy synthesis problem for multi-
objective properties that only involve total reward properties of
the form RrZx½C. The problem has been recently investigated in
[32,33]. As discussed in Section 4.1, there exist games in which
neither Player 1 nor Player 2 have winning strategies. Moreover,
for stopping games with precise-value objectives randomised
exponential memory strategies may be needed for Player 1 to win
[34], and, for stopping games with general total reward objectives,
randomised inﬁnite memory strategies may be required [32]. The
problem of whether there exists a pure winning strategy for Player
1, in stopping games, is undecidable [32].
The ε-approximation of the Pareto set for a stopping game G
and a multi-objective property ΦðxÞ can be computed using the
iteration algorithm in Fig. 5. Intuitively, the set VnnðsÞ for a state
sAS computed in the nth iteration of the algorithm is the down-
ward closure of vectors of bounds achievable by Player 1, from s, in
the ﬁnite time horizon of up to n steps. As Player 1 can randomise
between successors of his/her states, the set VnnðsÞ for sAS1 is
computed as a downward, convex closure of the union of Vnn1ðs0Þ,
for all s0 such that Δðs; s0Þ ¼ 1. For sAS2, the bounds must be
achievable for all successor states and, hence, we take the inter-
section. Finally, for probabilistic states sASp, we consider the sum
weighted by the corresponding probabilistic distribution.
Given an ε-approximation of the Pareto set, the corresponding
ε-optimal Player 1 strategy can be constructed as described in [33].
To succinctly represent such strategies using a ﬁnite set of memory
elements, the authors extend the deﬁnition of a strategy from
Deﬁnition 4 to allow stochastic memory update, i.e., the memory
update function is of type πu : M  S-DðMÞ and the initial
memory element function is π init : S-DðMÞ. In the construction,
the vertices of approximation sets VnnðsÞ; sAS, act as memory
Fig. 6. An ε-approximation of the Pareto set for multi-objective total reward
property Rrtimerx1 ½C4R
renergy
rx2 ½C for the game introduced in Example 1.
Fig. 7. An ε-approximation of the Pareto set for multi-objective probabilistic LTL
property PZp1 ½F succ4PZp2 ½G:acc for the game introduced in Example 1.
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strategy currently aims to achieve. The distributions in functions
πu and π init are constructed so that the expected value of the next
memory element is an ε-approximation of the target reward
bounds x. Comparing to deterministic update strategies from
Deﬁnition 4, with stochastic memory update strategies the
memory required to win reduces from up to exponential to linear
for stopping games with precise-value objectives [34] and from up
to inﬁnite to ﬁnite for stopping games with general total reward
objectives [32].
Besides conjunctions of total reward properties, the authors in
[32] discuss multi-objective properties constructed as a disjunc-
tion of total reward properties. It is shown that there exists a
strategy achieving the disjunction if and only if there exists a
strategy achieving a certain single-objective total reward property
and thus pure memoryless strategies sufﬁce to achieve a dis-
junction of total reward properties. Moreover, an algorithm for
computing an ε-approximation of the Pareto sets for stopping
games is presented. By combining the two algorithms for con-
junctions and disjunctions, we obtain a solution for any positive
Boolean combination of total reward properties for stopping sto-
chastic games through ﬁrst rewriting the combination into con-
junctive normal form.
Example 5. For the autonomous car from Example 1, we consider
the conjunction of total reward properties Rrtimerx1 ½C4R
renergy
rx2 ½C that
aims to compute a strategy that, simultaneously, guarantees that
the expected total time is at most x1, and the expected total energy
is at most x2. An ε-approximation of the Pareto set computed using
the algorithm in Fig. 5 for ε¼ 0:1 is shown in Fig. 6. For example,
for x1 ¼ 3:4; x2 ¼ 5:7, the winning strategy generated by PRISM-
games for the property is a stochastic memory update strategy
with 155 memory elements that, in a non-trivial way, probabil-
istically switches between changing lane and honking for both
hazards. The strategy can be viewed at [52].
4.3. Multi-objective probabilistic reachability properties
Using the reduction of probabilistic reachability properties to
total reward properties described in Section 3.2, the iterative
algorithm in Fig. 5 can be adapted to compute ε-approximations of
Pareto sets for any stopping stochastic game with a multi-objective
property that involves only probabilistic reachability properties.
Disjunctions of probabilistic reachability properties can be
addressed in a similar manner, using the reduction from Section
3.2 with the algorithm for disjunctions of total reward properties
from [32]. Hence, stopping games with any positive Boolean
combination of probabilistic reachability properties can be
handled.4.4. Multi-objective probabilistic LTL properties
For stopping stochastic games, the strategy synthesis problem
for multi-objective properties involving only probabilistic LTL
properties PZpi ½ψ i;1r irn, has been discussed in [33]. In this
case, the solution is to construct a deterministic Rabin automaton
for each ψi and then build a synchronous product of all the
automata and the original game G, with a new terminal state
which is entered after G enters any of its terminal states. Since G is
stopping, it indeed sufﬁces to analyse satisfaction of formulas
upon reaching a terminal state. The problem then reduces to sol-
ving the product game with respect to a multi-objective reach-
ability property. Finally, since the resulting product game is again
stopping, we can apply the approach from Section 4.3. It follows
that, in fact, we can solve any positive Boolean combination of
probabilistic LTL properties for stopping stochastic games.
For general stochastic games, the strategy synthesis problem
for multi-objective probabilistic LTL properties remains open.
Example 6. Consider the conjunction PZp1 ½F succ4PZp2 ½G:acc
of the reachability and safety LTL properties for the autonomous
car example. An ε-approximation of the Pareto set computed using
the algorithm in Fig. 5 for ε¼ 0:001 is shown in Fig. 7. For example,
for p1 ¼ 0:7; p2 ¼ 0:2, there exists a pure memoryless winning
strategy (in PRISM-games generated as a stochastic memory
update strategy with 25 memory elements) that brakes in a trafﬁc
jam and honks when approaching a pedestrian. The strategy can
be viewed at [52].
4.5. Mixed multi-objective properties and compositional strategy
synthesis
From the sections above it follows that, for stopping stochastic
games, we can ε-approximate Pareto sets for any positive Boolean
combination of total reward, probabilistic reachability and prob-
abilistic LTL properties.
In [7], the authors also discuss a different approach to multi-
objective strategy synthesis through composition. First, a compo-
sition of stochastic games is deﬁned, in a way that preserves the
identity of Player 1. Here, the component stochastic games
Gi; iA I¼ f1;…;Ng, that are being composed are considered to have
labels on Player 1 and Player 2 transitions referred to as actions
and, in the composed game G¼ J iA IGi, component games syn-
chronise on actions. Properties of the component games, as well as
the composed game, are then deﬁned over sequences of actions
called traces, rather than over paths as in Deﬁnition 6. Under the
assumption that the component games are compatible, i.e., all
actions of Player 1 in each composite game are enabled and fully
controlled by Player 1, the Player 1 strategy π ¼ J iA Iπi for G that is
a composition of Player 1 strategies πi for component games Gi
preserves all properties. More precisely, if strategies πi guarantee a
Fig. 8. An ε-approximation of the Pareto set for mixed multi-objective property
PZp1 ½F succ4PZp2 ½G :acc4R
renergy
rx1 ½C for the game introduced in Example 1.
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then the composed strategy π guarantees property Φ in G, where
Φ is any property for the composed game that can be derived from
Φi using, for example, assume-guarantee rules in [53]. In parti-
cular, Player 1 of different component games can cooperate to
achieve a common goal: if in one component game Player 1 guar-
antees a property Φ2 under some assumption Φ1 on the envir-
onment, i.e.,Φ1 ) Φ2, and Player 1 in a different component game
ensures Φ1, then the composition satisﬁes property Φ2.
The framework for compositional strategy synthesis presented
in [7] ﬁrst computes an ε-approximation Q of the Pareto set for Φ
based on ε-approximations Qi of Pareto sets for Φi. For a chosen
achievable vector of bounds ðp; xÞ for Φ, Player 1 strategies πi are
synthesised for component games Gi that achieve Φiðpi; xiÞ, where
ðpi; xiÞ are the bounds obtained by projecting ðp; xÞ from Q to Qi.
The composed strategy π ¼ J iA Iπi then achievesΦðp; xÞ. Note that
in order to take full advantage of assume-guarantee rules, we
would need to be able to synthesise strategies for arbitrary Boo-
lean combinations of properties.
Example 7. An example illustrating the compositional approach
to multi-objective game solving can be found in [78]. Here, we
present results obtained using reductions to total reward proper-
ties as discussed earlier in this section. We combine various
properties for the autonomous car from Example 1 in the fol-
lowing conjunction:
PZp1 ½F succ4PZp2 ½G:acc4R
renergy
rx1 ½C:
An ε-approximation of the Pareto set computed using the algo-
rithm in Fig. 5 for ε¼ 0:01 is shown in Fig. 8. For example, for
p1 ¼ 0:7; p2 ¼ 0:13; x1 ¼ 5:7, the winning strategy for the property
generated by PRISM-games is a stochastic memory update strategy
with 775 memory elements that, in a non-trivial way, probabil-
istically chooses between all three reactions for a trafﬁc jam and
between honking and braking for a pedestrian. The strategy can be
viewed at [52].
4.6. Multi-objective discounted reward properties
To the best of our knowledge, properties that combine multiple
discounted reward properties have only been addressed for the
subclass of stochastic games with one player and probabilistic
states, i.e., MDPs [29]. Note that the reduction from discounted
reward to total reward properties discussed in Section 3.5 alters
the transition probabilities of the game depending on the discount
factor βAð0;1Þ. It follows that, using this reduction, the iterative
algorithm in Fig. 5 can be applied to compute ε-approximations ofPareto sets for any stochastic game with a Boolean combination of
discounted reward properties with the same discount factor.4.7. Multi-objective average reward properties
For multi-objective synthesis with multiple average reward
properties, we cannot apply the approach presented in Section 4.2.
The reason is that the algorithm in Fig. 5 approximates the Pareto
set in a ﬁnite number of iterations by combining the achievable
values of successive states. However, inﬁnite horizon properties
such as the expected average reward disregard all transient
behaviour. Preliminary results for multi-objective average reward
synthesis have been presented in [6], where the authors consider
conjunctions of a special case of the (single-objective) expected
average reward properties, almost sure average reward properties
Rr¼ 1;Zx½S, that require that the average reward achieved over a
path is above a given bound with probability 1. Formally, given a
game G, its state sAS, a reward structure r and Player 1 and Player
2 strategies π;σ, respectively, the relation G; s;π;σFRr¼ 1;Zx½S
holds true if and only if
Prπ;σG;s ðfλAPaths∣rewðr;SÞðλÞZxgÞ ¼ 1:
Note that this implies G; s;π;σFRrZx½S, but the reverse implica-
tion is not necessarily true, see [6] for an example.
The authors show that synthesis for multi-objective properties
of this type reduces to synthesis for multi-objective expected
energy properties. Intuitively, given a reward structure r possibly
assigning both positive and negative values to states, the expected
energy property requires that, for every state sAS of the game,
there exists a bound x such that the expected total reward
obtained starting from s in k steps is at least x for all kZ0. Only
ﬁnite-memory (possibly stochastic memory update) strategies are
considered and it holds that every Player 1 strategy that satisﬁes
the expected energy property also satisﬁes the almost sure average
reward property over the same reward structure with bound 0,
and hence the same applies for ε-optimal strategies. As Rr¼ 1;Zx½S
is equivalent to Rr x¼ 1;Z0½S, the above property can be adapted for
any almost sure average reward property.
Given a game G, multiple reward structures r (allowing both
positive and negative reward values), a vector of bounds x for the
almost sure average reward properties and ε40, the authors
design an algorithm that terminates with a ﬁnite-memory sto-
chastic update ε-optimal strategy if the vector x is achievable. The
algorithm uses value iteration to compute ε-optimal strategies for
the corresponding multi-objective expected energy property.
Finally, the authors generalise the almost sure average reward
property to a ratio reward property Rr=c¼ 1;Zx½S, where, given a
game G, its state sAS, two reward structures r; c and Player 1 and
Player 2 strategies π;σ, respectively, the relation G; s;π;σF
R
r=c
¼ 1;Zx½S holds true if and only if
Prπ;σG;s λAPaths∣rewðr=c;SÞðλÞZx
  ¼ 1; where
rewðr=c;SÞðλÞ≔lim inf
k-1
rewðr;CrkÞðλÞ
rewðc;CrkÞðλÞþ1:
Note that property Rr¼ 1;Zx½S is equivalent to property R
r=c
¼ 1;Zx½S
for a reward structure cðsÞ ¼ 1; sAS. To solve the strategy synthesis
problem for a ratio reward property Rr=c¼ 1;Zx½S, it sufﬁces to solve
the problem for the almost sure average reward property
Rr xc¼ 1;Z0½S, and this can be straightforwardly extended to multi-
objective properties using vectors.
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Software tools for analysis of games include the following.
Among the tools that focus on subclasses of stochastic games,
QUASY [30] offers synthesis of strategies for MDPs and non-
stochastic games with mean-payoff objectives. Methods for
expected ratio reward objectives are implemented in [44]. Multi-
Gain [15] solves MDPs with multi-objective mean-payoff proper-
ties. PRISM [56] performs veriﬁcation for MDPs with single- and
multi-objective properties, namely probabilistic LTL and expected
total reward. MOCHA [1] is a tool for veriﬁcation and strategy
synthesis for non-stochastic games with alternating-time tem-
poral logic (ATL) speciﬁcations, as well as for automatic checking
of assume-guarantee queries.
For stochastic games, GIST [31] offers support for qualitative
veriﬁcation, i.e., probability 1 or non-zero probability, of stochastic
games with ω-regular properties. GAVSþ [37] includes imple-
mentation of value and policy iteration for stochastic games with
reachability properties.
Finally, for various extensions of stochastic games brieﬂy dis-
cussed in Section 7 below, EAGLE [75] and PRALINE [17] analyse
Nash equilibria for non-stochastic games. Uppaal Stratego [42]
performs strategy synthesis for real-time systems against quanti-
tative properties. The TuLiP toolbox [79] provides synthesis for
linear (continuous) systems with GR(1) speciﬁcation.
In comparison, most of the algorithmic solutions presented in
this paper including single- and multi-objective, as well as com-
positional strategy synthesis problems for stochastic games and
games with multiple players, have been implemented in the open-
source tool called PRISM-games [36,55], which can be downloaded
from [65]. PRISM-games can be used to model, verify, solve and
simulate stochastic games with complex properties. It has been
developed as an extension of the probabilistic model checker
PRISM [56] and takes advantage of PRISM's modelling and speci-
ﬁcation language, as well as the existing user interface and
simulator.
The original version, PRISM-games 1.0 [36], allows one to
model multi-player stochastic games as introduced in Deﬁnition 9
using modules with synchronising actions. The recently released
version, PRISM-games 2.0 [55], adds a compositional modelling
approach to facilitate the compositional strategy synthesis dis-
cussed in Section 4.5.
The speciﬁcation language is based on rPATL [35], a fragment of
the branching-time logic in Deﬁnition 8 that also allows speciﬁ-
cation of properties for coalitions of players as discussed in Section
3.8. In particular, rPATL subsumes single-objective probabilistic
reachability, a restricted class of probabilistic LTL properties, and
total reward properties with ρ¼ Fn a, and their Boolean combi-
nations. In the ﬁrst version, PRISM-games support rPATL formulas,
numerical queries and precise-value operators P ¼ p;Rr¼ x [34]. The
new version adds several single-objective properties, namely total
reward properties with ρ¼ C for stopping games, average reward
and ratio properties for a special class of games called controllable
multichain games (for details, see [78]), and almost sure average
reward and ratio properties. Besides single-objective properties,
PRISM-games 2.0 allows multi-objective properties expressed as
Boolean combinations of the same type of reward properties,
except for the almost sure average and ratio reward properties for
which only conjunctions are supported.
From the implementation point of view, PRISM-games builds
on the Java-based engine of PRISM and handles games in an
explicit-state fashion. In the multi-objective strategy synthesis, a
feature introduced in the new version of the tool, the computation
relies on the Parma Polyhedra Library [5] for symbolic manipula-
tion of convex sets during ε-approximate computation of
Pareto sets.6. Case studies
Stochastic games have been used to model and analyse various
control and networked systems. Here we list a set of examples that
have been evaluated using PRISM-games, and offer their intuitive
description. As mentioned in Section 5, tools such as GIST and
GAVSþ provide partial support for stochastic games, but have only
been used with small, illustrative examples. For more information,
we refer the interested reader to the indicated publications and
references therein. Experimental evaluation of some of the
examples can also be found in [36,55]. A more exhaustive list of
examples is maintained in the publications section of the PRISM-
games website [65] and in the database of PRISM and PRISM-
games case studies [66].Microgrid demand-side management [73]
The example models a decentralised energy management
algorithm for smart grids. The system consists of a set of house-
holds that generate loads of various duration. Each household
follows a simple algorithm to execute a load if the current energy
cost is below a pre-agreed limit, otherwise it only executes the
load with a pre-agreed probability. The energy cost to execute a
load for a single time unit is the number of loads currently being
executed in the grid. The algorithm is analysed with respect to the
expected load per cost unit for a household, formulated as a
single-objective total reward property.Collective decision making for sensor networks [73]
Sensor networks comprise of a set of low-power, autonomous
devices that often must collaborate to achieve a goal. Here, a set of
sensors is considered with the goal to agree on a target with the
highest quality using a decentralised decision algorithm. In the
algorithm, a sensor can probabilistically change its preferred target
either based on its own exploration of available targets or based on
communication with other sensors. The proposed decision pro-
cedure is analysed with respect to the speed of convergence, for-
mulated as a total reward property, and robustness, i.e., the ability
to recover from a bad decision to a good one, formulated as a
branching-time property with nested probabilistic operators.Reputation protocol for user-centric networks [73]
User-centric networks are designed to encourage users to
cooperate in sharing resources and services in order to, for
example, provide connectivity in a mobile ad hoc network. The
case study presents a general model consisting of providers
offering services to requesters. A requester chooses a provider and
submits a request. The provider decides whether to accept the
request based on a trust level towards the requester that is
dependent on his/her reputation across all users in the network. If
the request is accepted, the cost of the service is negotiated. After
service delivery, the requester chooses whether to pay the cost or
not, thus increasing or decreasing his/her trustworthiness,
respectively. Using expected total reward properties, the max-
imum number of unpaid services that the requester can obtain is
computed as well as the minimum price at which the requester
can buy a particular number of services. Strategy synthesis is used
to uncover possibly undesirable optimal behaviour of the reques-
ter in the latter case, and an adjustment to the protocol is sug-
gested to improve it.
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An investor in a futures market decides when to invest in
shares of a speciﬁc company. The decision can be made on the ﬁrst
day of any month collecting the payoff one month later. The
market value of shares changes probabilistically over time within a
bounded range and the distribution changes based on the current
value. Moreover, the market can temporarily decide to bar the
investor from making the investment. The corresponding sto-
chastic game is analysed to compute the maximum expected
payoff that the investor can guarantee for various initial share
values and the optimal strategies are discussed.
Human-in-the-loop UAV mission planning [46]
An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is performing road network
surveillance, reacting to inputs from a human operator. The UAV
acts autonomously in fulﬁlling most of the piloting functions, such
as selecting most of the waypoints that comprise the route, and
ﬂying the route. The operator primarily performs sensor tasks at
waypoints but may also pick a road for the UAV at waypoints. The
optimal UAV piloting strategy depends on mission objectives, e.g.,
safety, reachability, coverage, and operator characteristics, i.e.,
workload, proﬁciency, and fatigue. For the stochastic game mod-
elling the situation, the minimum expected time of completing the
temporal mission of covering a set of waypoints is computed.
Moreover, a multi-objective property is considered to analyse the
trade-off between the completion time and the number of visits to
restricted operating zones.
Autonomous urban driving [33]
An autonomous car is considered that drives through an urban
environment and reacts to hazards such as pedestrians, obstacles,
and trafﬁc jams. Note that this case study serves as a motivation
for our illustrative example presented in Example 1. Here, the car
does not only decide on the reactions to hazards, but also chooses
the roads to take in order to reach a target location. The presence
of hazards, as well as the effects of reactions, may differ between
roads. Through multi-objective strategy synthesis, strategies with
optimal trade-off between the probability of reaching the target
location, the probability of avoiding accidents and the overall
quality of roads on the route are identiﬁed.
Aircraft power distribution [6]
An aircraft electrical power network is considered, where
power is to be routed from generators to buses through con-
trollable switches. The generators can exhibit failures and switches
have delays. The system consists of several components, each
containing buses and generators, and the components can deliver
power to each other. The network is modelled as a composition of
stochastic games, one for each component. Compositional strategy
synthesis is applied to ﬁnd strategies with good trade-off between
uptime of buses and failure rate. The property is modelled as a
conjunction of ratio reward properties.
Self-adaptive software architectures [51,38,39,19]
Software systems dealing with distributed applications in
changing environments normally require human supervision to
continue operation in all conditions. Self-adaptive software
architecture is a response to these demands, where the system
automatically adapts its structure and behaviour according to
changes in real time. Both single- and multi-objective veriﬁca-
tion of multi-player stochastic games is applied to analyse threeself-adaptive software architectures, namely, the impact of
communication topology for collections of fully cooperative
systems defending against an external attack, the infrastructure
for a news website, and an adaptive industrial middleware used
to monitor and manage sensor networks in renewable energy
production plants.
DNS bandwidth ampliﬁcation attack [43]
The Domain Name System (DNS) is an Internet-wide hier-
archical naming system for assigning IP addresses to domain
names, and any disruption of the service can lead to serious con-
sequences. A notable threat to DNS, namely the bandwidth
ampliﬁcation attack, where an attacker attempts to ﬂood a victim
DNS server with malicious trafﬁc, is modelled as a stochastic game.
Veriﬁcation and strategy synthesis is used to analyse and generate
countermeasures to defend against the attack.7. Conclusion
In this work, we have overviewed the existing body of
knowledge and algorithmic solutions to the veriﬁcation and
strategy synthesis problems for stochastic games. We addressed a
large class of properties, from probabilistic linear-time through
various expected reward properties, to their branching-time and
multi-objective combinations. As demonstrated through the case
studies, the techniques can be used to analyse various control
systems, for example, in network management, autonomous and
human-in-the-loop planning, and security attack counter-
measures. Evaluation of such systems can be achieved using the
practical implementation of the algorithms in PRISM-games.
Though several of the algorithms have high computational com-
plexity, the range of case studies that have been tackled using
stochastic games is encouraging, and we anticipate that by
adapting implementation techniques that have been successful in
probabilistic veriﬁcation, for example symbolic methods and
Monte carlo sampling will allow us to broaden the applicability
even further.
While some of the open questions have already been identiﬁed
in the previous sections, the following extensions of games pose
further challenges.
Concurrent games, where players choose their moves con-
currently rather than in turns, comprise the original games with
probability introduced by Shapley [71], and they are a natural
extension of stochastic games discussed here. For an overview of
existing techniques, see, e.g., [47,61,22].
Partial-observation games, where the current state of the game
is only partially observed (by one or both of the players), represent
another widely studied model of games [21,70]. Recent results
include [20,24]. Besides concurrent and stochastic games, they
subsume models such as partially observable Markov decision
processes (POMDPs) [63] and probabilistic automata [69].
There exist several extensions of games to inﬁnite state spaces.
For example, uncertain or bounded-parameter MDPs [62,57,80,67],
pushdown games [45], and a large class of timed games
[11,49,14,68].
Finally, one can consider nonzero-sum games, or games with
equilibria, where the objectives of players are not necessarily dual.
For an overview of results, see, e.g., [77,76] and references therein.Acknowledgements
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